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, 'SANGUINETTI Y. MOORE DRY.
plaint to be amended I>y··:increasing the
DOCK C O . '
prayer for damages, is improper.
,\.

S. F. 18232.

4. Damages *'>208(1)

Supreme Court of CalifornIa, In Bank.
Marob 13, 1951.

The amount of damages is ordinarily
a question of fact for the jury.

Rebearlng Denied Aprllt2, t95L

5. Seamen *'>29(4)
Aotlon nnder the Jones Aet by LouIs L.
In action under the Jones Act, if
Sanguinetti against Moore.,Dry Dook ComP&D1, also known as MooreDrydoek Com- plaintiff had shown injuries for which
pany. a rorpor"tlon, for "injuries .sustained by amount claimed in complaint would con~
PJaintirr ·wbll. In the employ Or defendant. stitute clear compensation, ht; would _not
The Superior Court In and for the City and necessarily be entitled to recover such
County of San FrancIs"", LU. T. Jacks, J., amount, if his own negligence contributed
entered judgment for plaintiff' and the de- proximately and in any substantial degree
fendant appealed.
The Supreme Court, to such injuries, and it. would be the duty
Scbauer, J., ~eld that the operator in charge of the jury, to compare the negligence of
ot ,a tug was a master entitled to sue under the parties, and award plaintiff only that
the JoneS' Act and that moving to increase In
the presence ot the jury at the conclusion of proportion of the 'amount claimed which
plftlntltf's ease In cbief for leave to amend defendant's negligence bears to the entire
cOmplaint' 80 as to increase the amount negligence attributable to both parties.
Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688.
sued tor was prejudicial error.
Judgment reversed and caused remanded

tor a new trial.
Gibson, O. J., Traynor and Carter, JJ., dis-

sented.
For prior opinion see 220 P.2d 398.

6. Negligence *,>136(14, 25)

The issues of negligence and proxi~
mate cause are ,es~entially questions of fact.
7. Negllgen.o *'>136(31)

I.. Workman', compensation ¢:::::>262, 2089

Operator in charge of a tug who at
the time .he was injured was actively en~
gaged as master in navigating the tug and
was primarily on board to aid in navigation
'was a "master" excluded from the -coverage
of the Workmen's Compensation Act and
was entitled to mainta'in an action under the
JOt)es Act for injuries. Jones Act, 46 U.S.
c.A.. § 688; Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, §§ 1, 2, 3, 5,
33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901, 902, 903, 905.
.

Question of comparative negligence is
essentially one of fact.
6. Appeal and orror *'>1041(2)

In action under -the Jones Act, act 01
counsel for plaintiff in moving in presence
of Jury at conclusion' of plaintiff's 'case in
chief for leave to amend the complaint so
as to increase the amount sued for was
prejudicial error, where jury returned
the full amount demanded, substantial evidence supported position "fdefendant that
plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused
See publication Words aod PhrasC8,
by his own negligertc'e, and that if the negli,tor other ju~icial constructions aDd defi~
gence of defendant proximately contributed
nitiOJ1:8 of UMllster~·.
to the injuries the damages as'sessed should
be reduced by the jury under the compata2. 'Damages' *'>210(2)
Jury may be instructed as to the maxi- tive negligence doctrine. Jones Act, 46
U.S.C.A.§ 688.
inum.verdict which may be returned.

3. Trial .*'>106

9. Appeal and error *'>978(2)

The making of a motion in the presence of the jury after production of ev1
dence; to increase the amount of- damages
asked, and to bring to the knowledge of
the jury, the fact that the court after hearing plaintiff's evidence permitted the com6

While conclusion of trial court on a
motion for new trial with respect to con~
duct of ""ullsel of plaintiff in moving to
amend complaint in presence of jury is
entitled to much consideration, its decision thereon' is not conclusive on appeal.
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Williamson & Wallace, BrCfbeck, Phle- Oakland yard to Pier 18 in San Francisco,
ger & Harrison, Wallace, Garrison, Norton picked up a 66' derrick, barge loaded with
& Ray and Moses LaskY, al1 of San Fran- scrap steel, and towed the barge back to

cisco, for appellant.
the Oakland yard where the steel was unDion R Holm, City Atty., Edmond P. loaded. The barge was then to be docked
. Bergerot and George E. Baglin, Deputy at a pier a short distance away. Plaintiff
City Attys., all of San Francisco, Jennings testified that while the tug was in motion
& Belcher, Betts, Ely & Loomis, a1l of Los during the docking operations, it became
Angeles, as amicus curiz on behalf of ap- necessary, because of a faulty clutch on
the tug, for him to jump back and forth
pe1lant.
Hoberg & Finger, Henry G. Sanford from the tug to the barge. In so doing ile
and John H. Finger, all of San Francisco, lost his balance and his left leg was pinned
between the tug and the barge as they
for respondent.
swung together, and was badly ~ru.hed.
SCHAUER, Justice.
Defendant's first contention on appeal is
Defendant appeals from a judgment ren- that plaintiff was not a seaman entitled to
dered against it in plaintiff's action, sue under the Jones Act, but was rather a
brought under the Jones Act (46 U.S.C.A. harbor worker whose exclusive remedy is
§ 688)1, to recover for injuries suffered by under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
him while employed as the operator of Workers' Compensation Act (44 Stat. 1424,
defendant's tugboat, the uMoore No.2." ch. 509, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901, 905). That
We conclude tohat by reason of the miscon- Act provides in section 902, however, that
duct of counsel in moving in the presence "(3) The term 'employee' does not include
of the jury, at the close of plaintiff's evi- a master or member of a crew of any vesdence, to amend the complaint 'by increas- sel * * *," and in section 903 that
ing the amount prayed for as damages, "* • * No compensation shall be paywhich motion was subsequently granted by able in respect of the disability or deathl
the trial court, and the fact thereof brought 01-(1) A master or member 01 a crew of
to the attention of the jury, the judgment any vessel * • *."
must be reversed.

[1] Defendant's eounsel in his opening
The tugboat, 45' 10" in length and 12' 9" statement declared that plaintiff Cfwas the
wide, was used to tow other craft, to place operator in charge of the tug, and he was
barges alongside hulls under repair at de- in law what would be called a 'master', alfendant's shipyards in the Oakland Estuary, though in connection with tugs, it is norand to go where needed around San Fran- htally called an operator * * *." At
cisco Bay. When the tug was not in use, the time plaintiff. was injured he was acplaintiff did rigging work in the yard. He tively engaged as master in navigating the
testified that his 4O-hour work week was tug and was "naturally and primarily on
divided into approximately 24 hours as board to aid in her navigation" (South
master of the tugboat and 16 hours as rig- Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett
ger; his hourly rate of pay was greater (1939), 309 U.S. 251, 260, 60 S.Ct 544, 84
as tugboat operator than as rigger. His L.Ed. 732). It thus appears that, as plainorders came from the rigging department. tiff asserts, under the holding of the case
Plaintiff sometimes handled the tug alone just cited and of Warner v. Gohra (1934),
and at other times was assisted by a deck- 293 U.S. ISS, 159, 55 S.Ct. 46, 79 L.Ed. 254,
hand.
and Norton v. Warner Co. (1944),321 U.S.
On May 2, 1947, plaintiff, pursuant to 565, 571-572, 64 S.Ct. 747, 88 L.Ed. 931, he
orders, took the tugboat from defendant's is as master excluded from the coverage
I. "Any seaman· who shall suffer personal
injury in the course of his employment
may, at his election, maintain an action
for damages at law, with the right of
iIoial by jury, and in such action all

statutes of the United Statea modifying
or extending the common·law right of
remedy in cases of personal injury to
rlll1way employees shall apply * • • I,

SANGUINETTI v. MOORE DRY DOCIt CO.
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of the Workers' Compensation Act, and is
entitled to maintain. this action. Moore
Dry Dock Co, v. Pillsbury (1938), 9 Cir.,
100 F.2d 245, relied upon by defendant,
concerned a deckhand who was droWned
while engaged in repairing a tugbOat while
she was tied up at the dock, and is not
decisive here.
Defendant next contends that plaintiff's
counsel committed misconduct in moving,
in the presence of the jury, to amend the
prayer of the complaint to ask $75,000 instead of $50,000 in damages, and thit such
misconduct when followed by the action
of the court, after argument without the
jury's presence, in granting the motion, resulted in such prejudice to defendant as to
require reversal of the judgment..
The record discloses the .following proceedings in the jury's presence at the close
of plaintiff's case:
""Mr. Hoberg [Counsel for Plaintiff]:
• • • Plaintiff will rest but asks leave
to amend the complaint to increase the
amount in the prayer..from $50,000 to '$75,000 incurred and to be incurred on the evidence that has been submitted here 'before
the Court and jury.
"Mr. Ray [Counsel for Defendant]: I
desire to argue that matter in chambers
and reserve the right at this time to move

Cal
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his motion for a mistrial on the ground of
misconduct of plaintiffs counsel in presenting the motion in the jury's presence,
and the court denied defendant's motion.
Defendant then presented its evidence, and
the caSe went to the jury with an instruction, among others, that (tThe damages
must be reasonable and cannot be in excess of the amount alleged in the complaint,
namely $75,000." The jury retired from
"the courtroom, and, thirty-five minutes later returned with a verdict for plaintiff in
the sum of $75,000.
.
[2] No California decision directly in
point has been cited or discovered by our
research. It is, of tourse, the rule in this
State that the jury may be ·instructed as
to the maximum verdict which may be returned,as was done here. (Lahti v. McMenamin (1928), Z04 Cal. 415, 421, 268 P.
644; see also McNulty v. Southern Pacific
Co. (1950), 96 Cal.App2d841, 216 P.2d
534.) In Buswell v. City & County of San
Francisco (1948), 89 CaI.App.2d 123, 133,
ZOO P.2d 115, in discussing defendant's
point that a .permitted amendment to increase the prayer had not been "formally
made to the complaint," the court mentions
that "At the end of the trial and in the
absence of fhe jury, plaintiffs moved to
amend the complaint; to conform to the

for a mis-trial upon the gr_ounds of plain- proof 'by 'increasing the prayer •

•

*

Defendant vigorously objected. The court
granted the motion." (Italics added.) The
point before us in the- instant case was thus
not Involved In Buswell. In Duffey v. General Petroleum Corp. (1949),93 CaI.App.2d
757, 758-759,209 P.2d 986,'t is stated that
"At the beginning of the trial, on October
19, 1948, plaintiffs' counsel moved to amend
the complaint by increasing the amount of
the alleged damage to $4,000, and the motion was granted. Defendant interposed
an objection to the amendment, but did not
ask for a continuance of the _trial by reason thereof. The jury returned a verdict
for $4,000." (Italics added.) No discussion of the point :he:-e at issue appears in
the opinion.
In several New York eases the impropri.
-ence ,of the jury."
ety of movingr , in the jury's presence, for
After argument the court granted plain- permission to increase the amount sought
tiff's motion, defendant thereupon renewed in the prayer of the complaint is discussed
tiff's misconduct in connection with the
motion.
"The Court: Well, I will hear- .that matter out of the presence of the jury."
The jurors were then dismissed, and the
following proceedings had:
--The Court: Now, then, in 'regard to
this motion ,to amend the complaint, have
yoit any authority there, or do you want to
let it go over until tomorrow?
"Mr. Hoberg: 'Ther~ is no question
about this, your Honor. I have done it a
hundred times.
"The Court: It is done every day ,here,
but I don't know whether in raising the
amount-whether that is a matter that
should have gone in outside of the pres-

228P.2d-13

. ---------.. . . .,-.

--------------~,~,-~
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and the practice' condemned. Thus, in
Kenney in South Shore Na lural Gas & Fuel
Co. (1908); 126 App.Div. 236, 110 N.Y.S.
503, 504-505; a· personal injury action,
"After
selection of the jury, and betM"
any evidence had been taken, plaintiff
moved to amend her complaint by changing
the amount asked in her prayer for relief
from $10,000 to $25,000. Defendant's
counsel duly objected, and the court reserved its decision thereon. The evidence
on both sides had been pradically completed before the court passed upon the motion,
and allowed the amendment asked for."
The verdict was for $20,000. On appeal
the judgment was reversed, with the follow-

the

ing observations by the court: uIt seems
that the court on the trial of an action

may, in the proper exercise of its discretion, permit plaintiff to amend his cornp1aint by increasing the amount of damages
demarided. CCitations.] • • • [But] we
do not think such an amendment can properly be permitted • • • [without] explaining why application for the privilege
had not' pr~viously been made * * •
[and] some reason showing the propriety
of the amendment" * * *.

•.•: -,. the record now before us
.*. discloses no reason for granting
the motion; unless the action of the Court
thereon' was influenced by the evidence prodt1Ced on the trial as to the extent and nature of plaintiff's injuries. * • • [nor]
is there * * * in the statement of the
court on granting the motion, a suggestion
of a reason why such an amendment was
asked for at that time, nor why it was then
granted * * *. As the motion was
made in the presence of the jury, and the
court held its disposition thereof until after the evidence 'l(.ras concluded, it is at
least probable that the jury may have been
to some extent influenced in arriving at
the unusually large verdict awarded by the,
perhaps unwarranted, assumption that the
court, after hearing the evidence, concluded that plaintiff had shown herself entitled
to larger damages than she had at first demanded in her complaint, and that the
court's favorable action all the -motion
was due to that fact." (Italics added.)
.~,

*.*

..,**~--------------~.

In Sandresky v. Erie R Co. (1915), 91
Misc. 67, 153 N.Y.S. 612, 613, "At the
opening of the trial, without an affidavit
of the plaintiff, the latter was permitted
to amend his complaint, increasing thc demand for damages * * *" for personal
injuries. After pointing out that the plaintiff had failed to explain why he had delayed until trial his motion -to amend, and
that the rule called for denial of the motion under such circumstances, the court
concluded, uWe think the present case is
within the rule, and that it was error to
permit the plaintiff to amend the complaint
in lhe pr.sfflce of lhe jury, and that because of this error the judgment should be
reversed, with costs, unless the plaintiff
is willing to stipulate that the damages
'&hall be reduced to come within the cause
of action originally pleaded." (Italics added.)
In Walker v. Bradt (1929),225 App.Di\".
415, 233 N.Y.S. 388, 391, the following appears: "Appellant's contention that the
court erred in permitting plaintiff during
the trial to increase the demand in her
complaint from $3,000 to $6,000 is without
merit. We are satisfied .that this was not
done in Ihe hearing of lhe jury, and the
amount of the verdict was less than $3,000."
(Italics added.)
In Pfeil v. Klein (1936), 247 App.Div.
510, 286 N.Y.S. 721, 722, a personal injury
action, the court said: "Plaintiff gave no·
intimation of any claim of damage, beyond $3,000, until the case was fully tried
and the jury had been charged, and then
asked to amend the complaint so as to demand $20,000 damage5. This motion was
denied, and then the court granted a motior.
to conform the pleadings to the proof. Tht
verdict. was for $8,000.
"The effect of the granting of the motion to conform the pleadings to the proof
was to conform the pleading to whatever
verdict the jury might find, and this, occurring, as it did, in the presence of tlu:"
jUTy~ carried the implication that the court
thought that the proof warranted a verdict
larger than $3,000. This caused prejudice
,to defendants, which requires a reversc.l.
[Citing the Sandresky and Kenney cases,.
supra.]

SANGUIN:E;TTI v. Jl[OOQ DJl.Y DOOK CO.
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, ."lJad tlte ver,dict been $3,000 or less, no
fu.:nnwould have been done. ,Blackwell
v. Finlay [1922], 233 ,N.Y. 361,' 364, 135
N.E.600;' Walker 'v. Bradt [supra]
** •." (Italics added.)
'In Blackwell v. Finlay, cited in P~ei1 v.
Klein, supra, "Plaintiff,. an !lttomey -•. -,
brought suit to recover the reasonable value
of services rendered by him to defendant
• *,*., The jury found for the plaintiff
• • .*, and rendered a verdict in his fa ..
~orfor $10,000 *' * *, which was the
amount demanded :in .the complaint." In
affirming the judgment the court commented (at page 364 of 233 N.Y. at page 601 of
135 N.E.): "At the close, of the evidence
.tl)eplaintiff was i'Ormitted to amend his
complaint by. alleging that the value 01
his services was $17,000 and demanding
judgment, for that amount. If the verdict
had been for more than the amount originally, demanded, it might have been urged
that this was an abuse of discretion and
~hat-the tlial judge ,was without power to
permit, the amendment. Vole agree, however, • • ..*. -that defendant was not
Prejudiced. He ,was not contesting the
value of th~ _services as originaJIy alleged

in ,the· complaint."
, And' in Sohman v. 'Metropolitan St. Ry.

Co. (1907), 56 Misc. 342, 106 N.Y.S. 1033,

in denyihg : de£~dant's motion to set- ~side
a verdict
:-the ground' of ,Surprise. the
court states, "The amendment of the complaiI)t byinereasing the' amount of damages claimed' was granted at, the close, of
the case' after ·all the evidence was before
the court. The argument ,was made in the
absence' of the jury, which had left the
courtrooin by direction bf 'the presiding
justice, and in accordance with his iristruc~
tions'
mention was made of the granting
of 'such motion by counsel in summing up
to 'the jury."
'
It,.
~is~o~ri case of Prichard v. Du~
binsky (1935), 338 Mo. 360, 89 S.W.2d

'on

no

the

530, 531, in rejectinjt defendant's contention
that "the court shOllld not have permitted
piaintiff to amend the petition at the close
of the evidence, byjincreasing the $10,000
prayed for as. damages to $2O,OOO/, it ,is.
pointed out thatl, "11te amendment was not'
made in the presence of the jury." (See
also Hinchliffe' v. 'Wenig Teaming Co.
(1916),
274 . 111. 417,
,
,., 113 N.E. 7fJ7, 708.)
.

[3-4] Regarc!less of the lack of California authority on th(; precise point. at issue,
we are ·convinced that· any .practice which
would include.th~_:IP-aking of a·motion, in
the presence of the jury, after production of
evidence, to. increase the amount of damages asked, and which would bring to the
knowledge of the jury the fact that the
court after hearing plaintiff's evidence permitted the complaint to be amended by increasing .the 'prayer: ·.for damages, should be
unhesitatingly .con~emned and stricken
down. As. commented in Starr v" United
States (1894), 153 U.S. 614,,626, 14S.Ct.
919,.38 L.Ed. 841, quoted in Bollenbach v.
United States (1946), 326 U.S. 607, 612,
66 S.Ct. 402, 90 ,L.Ed. 350,"lt is obvious
that under any system of jury trials the, influence of the trial judge on the jury is
necessarily and, prqperly of great weight,
and that his ligh~est, word ,or intimation i~
received with deference, and may prove controlling." (See ,also Vaughan v. Magee
(1914, 3 Cir.); 218 'F. 630, 631.) It is, of
course, elementaIt 9iat the amount of :damages is ordinarily question of fact to be
determined by the ,jury. (See 8 CaI.Jur.
87i,sec. 119, and cases there cited.)

a,

I

Plaintiff urges that in any event defendant eould not ha-k ~een prejudiced by what
occurred, inasmutli as the court, ~s6 instructed the jury generally that they were
the sale judges of :the evidence, they were
not' to be influenc~d;on factual issues by'any
action of the court;''that they were the 'sole
judges of any daln10ges to be awarded, and
that any· such damages must be. reasonable.!
: 111

2•.' Such' instrUctions include the' following:

·,tyotJ will distinctly understand that in
this charge th.e Court is in no manner
'or fOM expressing, or desires' to express,
'auy' op~ion on the weight of the ~videnee~
Or any part thereof; nor does the C~tirt
express .any opinion as to the. t~tJi , "QI:.
;~

1561

'

,1

falsity of the testimony' of any witness;
nor does the ,Court in ant manner or
form express its opinion tbat any alleged faet in thill case'is or is Dot proven.
With qUeStiODS bf fact,' the weight of evidence, the credit that you should give to
auy witness ,worn in ·th_e easc,· the Court

-------_._----;&;,."",,,,,'*' ' <!
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Plaintiff also points out that defendant
makes no contention that the jury's ver~
diet is disproportionate to the injuries sustained by plaintiff. But regardless of the
possible effect (or lack of effect) of this
fact in· a case based on California law, it
cannot be decisive here where issue was
joined not only on the amount of injuries
sustained but also (under the Jones Act) on
the proportionate responsibility (comparative negligence) of the parties, and where,
upon the state of the evidence, a large meas...
ure of discretion rests with the jury.

that of defendant, and on the further
ground that if any negligence of defendant
were found to have proximately contributed
to such injuries, then the damages to be
assessed should be reduced by the jury under the comparative negligence doctrine
which applies under the Jones Act. (See
The J. H. Hillman, 3 Cir. (1939), 108 F.2d
231; Stewart v. United States, D.C. (1928),
25 F.2d 869.) Substantial evidence was introduced by defendant in support of its position. Assuming that plaintiff had shown

injuries for which $75,000 would constitute
fair compensation he is, nevertheless, not
entitled to recover $75,000 from defendant
if plaintiff's own negligence contributed
proximately and in any substantial degree
to those injuries. In such event it would be
the duty of the jury to compare the negligence of plaintiff with that of defendant and,
to award plaintiff only that proportion of
$75,000 which defendant's negligence bears
to ''the entire negligence attributable to both
the plaintiff and the defendant." (Haskins
v. Southern Pac. Co. (1934), 3 Ca1.App.2d
177, 191, 39 P.2d 895.) This is not, therefore, a case in which the error can be said
to be non prejudicial because the issues were
resolved on undisputed or overwhelming ev.
idence. (See Blanton v. Curry (1942). 20
Ca1.2d 793, 813, 129 P.2d 1; Anderson v.
Hagen (1937), 19 Cal.App.2d 714, 726, 66
P.2d 168; Wilkerson v. City of EI Monte
(1936), 17 Cal.App.2d 615, 623, 62 P.2d 790
(Hrg.Den.).) As often emphasized by this
court (see e.g., Anthony v. Hobbie (1945),
25 Cal.Zd 814,817-818, 155 P.2d 826). "The
issues of negligence and proximate cause
are essentially questions of fact." Likewise
is the question of comparative negligence
essentially one' of fact, and because that
question is ordinarily resolved by the jury

baa nothing to do. These Bre matters
entirely within your province, and which
7011, as jurors, under your oaths, must
determine for yourselves. III • •
"It the judge of this Court has at any
time during this trial used any language,
or has seemed to you to indicate the
opinion of the judge as to any question of
fact, or as to the credibility of any wit~
ness, you must not be influenced thereby,
but must determine yourselves all ques~
tionS· of fact without regard to the opin~
ion of anyone else.
"The Court charges you that you are
Dot to use in the consideration or deter~
mination of any facts in the case any
reference to or comment on the evidence
which may have been made by the Court
during the course of the trial, in con~
nection with the admission of testimony
or otherwise. The determination of the
facts of the case is solely withit. your
province, and yon are not to be assisted
or influenced in any way by anything
which the Court may say or do in that
behalf. III III III,
"It is for you alone to judge of the
credibility of the witnesses, the weight

to be given the evidence offered, and its
elfects, and its conclusiveness, to esta})..
lish any fact for which it has been of~
fered. III III III
". •
III I, of course, do not know
whether you will need instructions on the
measure of damages, and the fact that
they have been given' to you -must not
be considered 8S intimating any opinion
of my own on the issue of liability or
as to which party is entitled to your
verdict. III • •
"You are instructed that the law pre~
scribes no definite measure of damages,
but the law leaves such damages to be
fixed by you as your discretion dictates
and as, under all the circumstances, may
be just and proper. It is not necessary,
therefore, that any witness should have
expressed an opinion as to the amount
of such damages, if any, sustained by
plaintiff, but it is for you, the ladies and
gentlemen of the jury, to make'such estimate of the damages, if any, from all
of the facts and circumstances revealed
by the evidence. and by considering them
in connection with your own knowledge
and experience in the alfairs in life."

[5-7] Defendant specifically resisted
plaintiff's claim of damages, on the ground
that plairitiff's injuries were proximately
caused by his own negligence rather than

SANGl1INBTTI v, MOORE DRY DOCE CO.
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o"ly by awarding a lump sum to the plain- doubt of the necessi!); of helping the, inthe witness chair, were
compensation for his injuries less such pro- prejudicial and constil\tted ,reversible error:
portion of the reasonable compensation as The opinion comments .(203 Cal. .-at pages
may be attributable to his own fault, the 120-121, 263 P. at pag~s 22i-223), that "It
likelihood of prejudice from an error such needs no citation to convince any unbiased
as that which we have here is intensified.
observer that a jury has both ears and eyes
open fot any little wQI-d or act of the trial
[8] .Under the circumstances we find no judge from which th~ may gather enough
reasonable basis for holding that defendant to read his mind and g.ct, his opinion of the
was not prejudiced by the jury's knowledge merits of the issues under review.
that the court had permitted plaintiff to ask The above error must, therefore, be held
for $75,000, rather than $50,000, "incurred sufficient in and of _itself under the circumand to be incitrr-ed on the evidence that has stances of this case
'compel a reversaJ of
been submitted here before the Court and the judgment • • •." (See also People
jury," especially when consideration is giv- v. Williams (1860), 17 Cal. 142, 147; Peoen to the further fact that, as defendant ple v. Mahoney (1927), 201 Cal. 618, 626points out, the "jurors retired, elected a 627, 258 P. 607; People v. Frank (1925),
foreman, reached a verdict~ fined in the form 71 CaI.App. 575, 581-582, 236P. 189; Peoof verdict, haei it signed by the foreman, ple v. Robinson (1946),73 CaI.App.2d 233,
notified the bailiff, the bailiff notified the 237, 166 P.2d 17 ;Citti v. Bava (1928), 204
court, the court' notified cotinsel, and the Cal. 136, 138--139, 266 P. 954; Steele v.
jury returned to the courtroom, all in 35 Wardwell (1943), 57 CaI.App.2d 642, ,648minutes."
652, 135 P.2d 628, in' which the appellate
The situation here, in legal effect, is ba.. court commented "This was a close case and
sically comparable to that i,n Oettinger v. the statements made by the court may well
Stewart (1944), 24 CaI.2d 133, 140, 148 P. have been the determining factor. In our
2d 19, 156 A.L.R. 1221, which prompted the opinion, the entire cas. 'should be reversed.
court to say, "In cases where it clearly ap.. • • ."; Anderson v; Hagen'(1937),19
pears that the jury did not rely upon the Cal.App.2d 714, 726, 66 P.2d 168, in which
erroneous instructions, the j""dgment may be the court reversed. saying, "BeCause the
affirmed on the ground that the. error is_not evidence on this vitali point _was in direct
prejudicial. This, however, is :not such a conflict, ,the error of .admitting this [hearcase. Neither the evidence of contributory say] testimony cannol be· said tob. withnegligence nor of negligence. although suf- out prejudice",; Curti$hr. McAuliffe (1930),
ficient as a matter of law, can be said to be 106 Cal.App. 1, 8, 288, P.675; 'Taylor v.
convincing, -and we should not speculate Aetna Life Insuranc.li/Co. (1933). 132 Cal.
upon the basis of the verdict." To the same App. 434, 439, 22P.2d 71'S.)
.
~
effect see also Pipoly v. Benson (1942), 20
[9]
Plaintiff
urges:1
that
the
trial
court's
CaI.2d 366, 375, 125 P.2d 482, 147 A.L.R.
515; People v. Dail. (1943), 22 Cal2d 642, action in denying de{~ndant's motions for
140 P.2d 828; Intagliata v. Shipowners & mistrial and for new I"ial. made upon the
Merchants Towboat Co. (1945), 26 Cal.2d ground of misC()nductiiof plaintiff's counsel
365, 382, 159 P 2d 1; Oement v. State Rec- in moving to amend i~ the presence of the
lamation Board (1950), 35 CaI.2d 628, jury establishes the ali~ence of prejudice to
220 P2d 897. We think that the implica- defendant (see Cope 11. Davison (1947), 30
tions of prejudice are at least as strong in Cal.2d 193, 180 P.2d ~73, 171 A.L.R. 667.)
a
such as this as in ,any of the cases However, as held in !f:ittlv. Bava (1928).
supra. 204 Cal. 136, 14\>; 266 P. 954, "While
cited.
In Berguin v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co. (1928), it is true that the oohclusion of the trial
203 Cal.· 116, 118--121, 263 P. 220, it was -court on the motiofl -lor a new trial is enheld that comments by the trial court in titled to much consi'd~ration its decision
the jury's presence which indicated his thereon is not conclusive on appeal t~

tiff, which sum must constitute reasonable jured plaIntiff 'to

*• •
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There is no contention that the making
and granting of the motion, under the circumstances shown, can be justified as •
permissible request for, and making of, comment on the evidence. (See Cal.Canst. Art.
VI, sec. 19.)
The judgment is reversed and the Cause
remanded for a new trial.
SHENK, EDMONDS and SPENCE, JJ.,
conCUT.

GIBSON, Chief Justice, and TRAYNOR,
Justice.
We dissent.
It is our opinion that this cause was COTrectly decided by the District Court of

Appeal and that the judgment should be
affirmed for the reasons set forth in the
opinion of that court by Justice Goodell, Z20
P.Zd 398.
CARTER, Justice.
I dissent.
The majority decision by four justices
of this court reaches a new low in search
for a reason to reverse a judgment abundantly supported by evidence and based
upon the unanimous verdict of a jury.
That judgment was approved by a most
learned, fair, careful, experienced and
able trial judge, and affirmed by the unanimous decision of a District Court of Appeal composed of three learned and able
justices with many years of trial and
appellate court experience. Sanguinetti v. Moore Dry Dock Co., CaJ.App., 220
P.2d 398. Four members of this court
(a majority) have reached a decision diamctrical1y opposed to that reached by seven
other members of the judiciary-the trial
judge, three District Court of Appeal justices and three members of this cOUrt.
That a miscarriage of justice will result
from this decision is apparent from a re"iew of the record before this court, but
the detriment to our system for the administration of justice from the effect of
this decision will far outweigh the loss to
plaintiff ,who is denied justice in this case.
The decision reached here .by these four
justices strikes a lethal blew at the very
heart of our judicial system-trial by jury.

It holds, in effect, that a jury may not
be informed as to the state of the pleadings
in a civil action. This is contrary to all
authorities on the subject. . While the
majority concede that it is not error for
the jury to be informed as to the amount
claimed in the prayer of the complaint,
they hold that it is incurable misconduct
amormting to re.versible error if a motion
to amend the complaint for the purpose of
increasing the amount prayed for is made
in the presence of the jury. There is not
a scintilla of reason or common sense in
such holding. It is so lacking in consideration of the realities of the situation that
it may be said to be naive. In 26 years of
practice before the courts of this state,
I heard many such motions made and granted in the presence of the jury, and in none
of those cases did the jury award the increased amount prayed for. No question
was ever raised by either court or counsel
as to the propriety of such practice, as
no one ever thought that anyone could be
misled thereby, it being well understood
among lawyers and laymen alike that a
demand for damages is not evidence that
plaintiff is entitled to damages in any sum
whatsoever. The fact that in this case
the jury awarded the increased amount
prayed for is no indication that they were
influenced by the motion which they heard
or the ruling of the court thereon which
they did not hear. Although the majority
opinion so implies, jurors are not fools.
Even if they are not lawyers, they have
much more intelligence than the majority
opinion indicates. They are entitled to
know, and should be informed, at the
beginning of the trial the amount plaintiff
is seeking to recover. It certainly would
have been proper for either the court or
counsel to inform the jury at the beginning
of the trial that plaintiff was claiming
$50,000 damages. And, as the majority
seem to concede, if the motion to amend
had been made out of the presence of the
jury, it would have been 'proper for the
court to have advised the jury at the close
of the case, as it did, that they could not
return a verdict in excess of $75,000, the
amount then claimed. Is the conclusion
not inescapable that the jury then muSt
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know that plaintiff had amended his complaint by increasing his demand? But,
suppose a juror did not know how or why
the amount of the. demand had been increased, and made inquiry, of the court.
could thecollrt flOt say· that plaintiff had
moved to amend his complaint by incrcas·
lng- the amount prayed for, and the court

had allowed such amendment? To say
that such statcmen\ is not permissible is to
make ostriches out of jurors, or,.place them
~ehind an "iron curtain/' a ,practice which
should not be countenanced in any enlight~ned system for the administration of justice. The rcaedonary philosophy of the
majority opinion ilO so out of harmony with
prescnt day concepts of trial. procedure
that- it resembles some of the skclcton~ of
the dead past, when conservative minded
judges found such technical and. fine-spull.
reasons _. for reversing judgments based
upon jury verdicts, that the people of thi!l
.itatc were constrained to adopt § 4!,1 of
.'\rtide VI of 'our Constitution, imposing
lipan appellate courts the requirement of
ndermining that any error committed 'by
a trial court must have resulted in a mis~arriage of justice before reversing a jmtg'ment based upon a jury· verdict. The liheral concept of _this constitutional provision has evidently not impressed the majority of this' court, as there is no su'ggc!Itif)n in the majority opinjon that a mi~
.;a.rrlage of justice resulted from the alleged
errol' in this case.
. It is conceded by the majority that their
tlecision is not supported by a single decision of any cOtJrt of this state. It, .sC'd~S
logical that an unprejudiced mind '!$e~kil1g
to 'rationalize the absence or latk-Iof' ;such
dt'cisions during a peri~ of over lOO,,:yeats
'nt the judicial history_of this statE',':and the
further fact that the statutory law ~f tIie
.fjtate is silent On the -suhject, would :corielude that the practice of making ,stich
-motions in the presence of the jury, h~d
never 'heretofore -been con~idcred: t' itriproper or cause for assignment :Of, ,Imis_
conduct or error. It should he apparent
to every unprejudiced _mind, as it" is _to
me, that the majority, in seizing upon this
motion as the sale ground for a reversal
of the judgment in this case, is simply

creating a mythical error which exists OI~ly
in hypertechllical illusion. Certainly, with
the widespread practice
making such
motions in the presence of the jury-wellknown to trial lawyers throughout the
state-some appellate court at some time
during the history of the state ·would have
been called upon to hold _ such practice
error if there was the slight<st hasis for
such holding. .
Furthermore, if such practice were as
deadly and vicious ,as the majo~ity, o'pinion
indicatE'S, it is more than probable that the
public liability insurance companies and
utilities wonld havt~ instrncted their lobby
group to prevail upon the Legislature to
enact legislation prohibiting such practice.
That· this has J10t occurred is persuasive.·
evidence of the recognized propriety of
!iuch practice.
To my mind the _majority decision in this
case is an abuse of the judicial process .
¥lc have here four judges, without tlrec(,M
dent or authority, announcing a rule contrary to the practice which has prevaitl"d
throt1ghollt the history of the state, and
contrary to the holding. of seven E'qualty
trained ,and ex.perienc~d judges. What
these four judges have done here is in'
direct conflict with the vie~v, expressed by
Mr. Justice Cardozo in his work entitled
"The Nature of the Judicial Process,"
He there declared. 'at page 112: "~~y
analysis of the judicial fJ(ocess comes -then
to this. and little morE': logic, and history,
and custom, and ntility•. ~nd the' acccpt~d
standards of right conduct, arc the forces
whkh singh' or -in combination shape the
prdgrcss of the law. \Vhich (if these forc.cs: :shall dominate in any cast',. '~ltst de~
perld largely upon the comparatiYe impottance or vahie of. the social' interest~
tha!t, \\'1.1.1 be· therehy promoted or irppaired."
,\\rhat these _four judges have done here
is" likewise contrary to the philo~ot>hy ex·
pr~sscd .by Judge Salmond at pages 19219.~ of the 10th edition of his' work 011
Ju~isprlldcnce. where he said: "vVhcre,
theJ1, do courts derive -tho,se new principles,
or rationes decidendi, by which they supplement the existing Jaw? They arc in
truth nothing. else than the principles of
na,tttral justice, practical expediency, and
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common sense. Judges are appointed to
administer justice-justice according to
law, so far as the law extends, but so far
as there is no law, then justice according
to nature."
In essence, what these four judges have
done here, is to blindly announce a courtmade rule which not only finds no support
in history, precedent, experience, custom,
practice, logic, reason, common sense or
natural justice, but is in utter defiance of
each and all of these ~tandards.

I shall now proceed to demonstrate the
fallacy of the holding of the majority in
this case.
Section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
"The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on such terms as may be proper,

allow a party to amend any pleading or
proceeding by adding or striking out the
name of any party, or by correcting a
mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; * * * The
court may likewise, in its discretion, after
notice to the adverse party, allow, upon
such terms as may -be just, an amendment
to any pleading or proceeding in other
particulars; • • •."
As was said in Isaacson v. Union Trust
Co., 95 Cal.App. 633, 638, 273 P. 119, 121,
"The matter of the allowance of trial
amendments to the pleadings rests in the
sound discretion of the court, and such
ruling should not be disturbed upon appeal
in the absence of a showing that prejudice
result~d therefrom to the extent that the
party aggrieved was deprived of a substantial right or placed in a position where
it may be said that he was deprived of a
fair trial." See, also, Unruh v. Kauffman,
205 Cal. 238, 244, 270 P. 440; Duffey v.
General Petroleum Corp., 93 Cal.App.2d
757, 759, 209 P.2d 986; 21 Cal.lur. 181
Further, "It is the settled law of this
state that ·motions to amend pleadings to
the end that justice may be promoted
are to be Jiberally granted." Rabe v.
Western Union Tel. Co" 198 Cal. 290,
299-300, 244 P. 1077, 1080; Klopstock
v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.2d 13, 19, 108
P.2d 906, 135 A.L.R. 318; Carter v. Lothian, 133 Cal. 451, 452, 65 P. 962; Mc-

Dougald v. Hulet, 132 Cal. 154, 162, 64
P. 278; Crosby v. Clark, 132 Cal. I, 8,
63 P. 1022; Guidery v. Green, 95 Cal. 630,
633, 30 P. 786. The same rules are applicable to amendments increasing the amount
of damages alleged. Duffey v. General
Petroleum Corp., supra; Hoffman v.
Southern Pacific Co., 101 Cal.App. 218,
229, 281 P. 681. It has also been held that
the right to amend should not be denied
merely because the new matter to be added
may have been known to the applicant
at the time of filing his original pleading.
Tolbard v. Cline, 180 Cal. 240, 245, 180
P. 610; Kroplin v. Huston, 79 Cal.App.2d
332, 340, 179 P.Zd 575. Moreover, an
amendment increasing the damage claim
does not change the cause of action stated.
Babcock v. Jewell, 110 Cal.App. 323, 320326, 294 P. 30.
Defendant asserts that the trial court
abused its discretion in granting the motion to amend because defendant was thereby surprised and prejudiced. This contention is predicated upon the assertion
that defendant's liability insurance was
limited to $50,000, the original amount of
the ,prayer, and accordingly "the insurance
company had been the sole party in interest" prior to the a·mendment This argument is also utterly devoid of merit. Two
days prior to the making of the motion,
the attorney supposedly representing defendant was informed that it would be
made. While defendant's request for a
continuance was denied, no good reason for
granting it appears. Defendant's attorney
informed the cOUrt at tpat time that he
knew he was supposed to proceed with
defendant's case and he stated that defendant's witnesses were present. The increased prayer, as heretofore shown, did
not change the cause of action and it did
not inject any new issue into the case.
Any arrangement _between defendant and
its insurance carrier as to the conduct
of the litigation couJd not possibly affect
plaintiff's right to amend.
Since the granting of the motion to
amend would be a proper exer<:ise of discretion by the trial court, the sole question is whether, under the circumstances
here, the making of that motion in the
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presence of the jqry constituted prejudicial weight to which they are entitled, w~re
misconduct requiring a, 'reversal of the plainly wrong. X do not believe tha.t Iliere
judgment.
is. any misconduct invol~d hi -the action
Section 657 of the Code of Civil Proce- of plaintiff's attorney.. In my opinion this
dure-: authorizes the granting of a, new
t~ial for: ".1. Irr,cgularity -in the proccedings_ of _the ,court, jury or adverse
party, or any order of ,the. court or abuse

contention does f1o~ .eve':l present a_ substantial 'question 'worthy of 'extended dis~
cussion by an appellate court. But e~en
assuming" the existence of mis,conduct, it'

of .discretion by. which· either party was is impossible to conceive how any prejuprevented from having .& fair. trial; dice to defendant could ,haVe tesulted,

• • *.,,'

especially in view of the evidence, the
instructions and the fulings of the trial
. :Underthi..ection, then, the alleged court ,on the qu~stion.
misconduct of counsel, in order to war-

rant a reversal of a judgment and the

Plaintiff's case· was based

u~n the

granting of a new trial, must be such as to theory that defendant was negligent in
have denied a fair trial to the complain.. maintaining the tug engine with a defec·

ing party. Robinson v. Western States
Gas & Elec. Co;, 184 Cal. 401, 407, 194
'P. 39; Langford v. Kosterlitz, 107 Cal.
App. 175, 186, 290 P. SO; Mullanixv.
J!asich, (j7 CaI.App.2d 675, 686, 155 P.2d
130; Gerberieh v.· Southern California
Edis!>Il Co.. 26 CaI.App.2d 471,476, 79
l'2d 783; . Coppock v. :Pacific Gas & .Etec.
Co., 137 CaI.App. SO, 90•. 30P,2d 549.
It.. i. also elementary that a trial judge is
in a better position than an appellate court

tive clutch and that this negligence was
the. proximate caUSe of plaintiff's injuries.

Plaintiff testified that shortly after· he be·
came the tug operator for defendant .1n
September, 1945, he discovered that the
clutch would stick so that he· could not
shift from forward speed. When this happened he would sometimes have to leave
the pilot house and go down to the en·
gine room to disengage the clutch. .lie
could not shut off the engine from the
~o :determine whether a verdict. resulted pilot house. He reported the clutch diffiwholly, or .in part, from the asserted mis- cultie. to Acosta, ..the. plant engineer in
conduct of c;ounsel, and his - c!>nelusion in charge of maintenance and repairs. He
the matter will not be disturbed unless it also spoke to Acosta about getting .an enis plainly wrong. Cope v. Davison, 30 Cal. tirely new engine, including a· clutch.
2d 193. 203, ISO P 2d 873, 171. A.I.R. Acosta considered such a purc~, but· def567; Walling v.Kimball, 17 0.1.2d 364, Cided against it. Although plaintiff re368-369,110 P.2d 58; Lafargue v. Unit- quested it. no work was done on the clutch
'~d Railroads, 183 Cal. 720, 724, 192 P. wh~n the t\1g was taken out of the water
'538. As was said in Hatfield 'Y. Levy in January, 1947, to repair the propeller.
Brothers, 18 CaI.2d 798, 814, 117 P2d 841. The clutch difficulties increased in Feb849, 'fA denial of .a, motion for & new trial .J7UlU'Y and April of 1947. Knapp, the genmade upon the ground of misconduct· of eral superintendent 'If defendant company,
Counsel, although not binding on th,s told plaintiff that they MOre not going to
~rt, is entitled to great _weight, ~ an spend any more ~oney. on the --Queen
appeal in which complaint i. made of the Mary."
miltCOnduct." Here, the trial
~nied
Aniialla and Hagstead, who worked .s
motions for mistrial and for a new trial deck hands on the tug, alsO testified as to
based upon the asserted misconduct of difficulties with the clutch.
plaintiff's attorn~y.
Plaintiff also testified that the clutch
. Viewed ;n the. light of these pri!>- again stuck on May Z. 1947, while· the
clples, then, the majority decision is .that tug was being used to bring a barge .from
the action. of counsel for plaintiff had San Francisco. Plaintiff called to An.the . effect of. denying a fair trial to de- nalla to come into the pilot hoUse and
fendant and the rulings of the trial court take the wheel. He then went down to
to the contrary, giving them the great the engine room and turned ·the clutch
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control tht!re. Both- AnnaUa and Pestana,
the crant:: operator on the 4errick barge,
corroborated plaintiff's account of this incident.
Plaintiff further testified _that, subsequently on the same day, while he was

attempting to dock the barge at the 8th
Street pier on tbe Oakland side 0 f tbe
bay, the clutch stuck once more. The
tug was tben about 12 to 15 feet from tbe
barge, coming in at a slight angle toward
it at a speed of about two or three knots
per hour. Plaintiff was unable to shift
into n'eutral. He did not have time to
go down to the engine room as he was
afraid that the tug would ram into an oil
tank and cause an explosion. He thought
that the best thing to do in order to stop

the tug was to throw a line on the barge
and jump over to secure it. When the
tug was about two or three feet away

barge and the tug. This line was ordinarily
used to pull a barge into uock and it was
his, Annalla's, job as deck hand to handlt
this rope. After -the accident ,he went
aboard the tug and shut off' everything.
Knapp, the general superintendent, testi-

fied that plaintiff had told him that the tu.
needed a new engine. He knew that there

was trouble with the clutch and he discussed that with plaintiff (although he also
testified that he did not recall specific complaints about the clutch). The engine was
old and obsolete and the purchase of a new
one had been -considered. Plaintiff was not
required by -any rules of the company t('l

keep the tug in repair. Acosta, the plant
engineer, was the person in charge of such
matters. After the accident the clutch was
taken out of the tug and repairs were made
on it.
Acosta testified that he was in full control
of repairs of equipment in the yard in 1947.

from the barge, plaintiff threw a looped
line (called a spring or breast line) on He talked to plaintiff a number of times
the barge and jumped over to the barge about the general condition of the Moore
at the saine time. He was off balance No.2, but he did not recall specific conifrom this fast movement and his legs plaints about the clutch. After the acci·
slipped over the side of the barge. His dent, when the clutch was repaired it
left leg was pinned between the barge showed only normal wear. Some parts
and the ,tug as- the tug came in and that were replaced. He did not find anything
leg was crushed, He finally pulled him- which, in his opinion, would cause tht"
self up on tbe deck of the barge. (He clutch to stick. (The marine shop foreman
did not testify tbat he jumped back and gave the same opinion.)
forth from the tug to the barge.) The
The testimony of Exter, a foreman 'of
forward motion of the tug was stopped by defendant's marine machinists in 1947, 'was
the rope that plaintiff had managed to get that plaintiff nad told him of the clutch
oVer a bit on the barge. He testified sticking. Exter would take complaints to
tbat, but for the faulty clutch on the tug. Acosta as he could not do anything without
he would not have jumped from the tug a work order from the latter. The tug was
to the barge. He . did not have time to not operated between the time of the accishout to. the deck hand (who was then on dent and the time the clutch was taken out
the barge). There was no other eye- and repaired. When they took the clutch

witness testimony of the accident.

cover off they could see that the bushings
Pestano, the crane operator, did not see and gears were badly worn and that there
the accident He heard plaintiff shout for was ·a great deal of slack in the pins and
help and found him with both legs hanging rods which operated the clutch from the
over the side of the barge. The tug was pilot house.
then about two feet away from the barge
Forrest, a marine machinist employed by
and was tied to the barge >by the spring line defendant, stated that he found the clutch

described by plaintiff.
in bad shape after the accident and he had
Annalla was on the barge and did not it taken completely out and sent it to the
witness the accident. He found plaintiff .hop. After the clutch was restored to the
dangling over the side of the barge. The tug, he checked it and it did not look safe
spring line was then fastened between the to him. He thought that the clutch would
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,still stick. He did som~ more work on it rough ,s,urfaces, or.do.-anything which call!
functioned
prop- for.
the correct
maintenance of one's bal· and thereafter the. clutch
,,- 'I
.
.
er1y.
anee." His walking capacity, as to dis·
Dr. Wagner,- an orthope4ic surgeoll, gave tan'ce,. is. very .limited. (Plaintiff set the
the only medical testimony. He began limit at abollt twobl~&s and stated that he
treating plaintiff .after· October 4, 1947. cannot walk at.all,Hithout severe pain.)
· The x-ray pictures show ifractures of the
Plaintiff testified that ·he is. 33 years of
tibia of the left ieg which extelld into the age and is married.: In addition to his em·
ankle joint. The union of the upper -and ployment with dc~e,9da~t as a ,tug operator
fower fragments of the tibia will not be and a- rigger, he has worked as a commereomplete for several more months., There cial fisherman and 'on a' pile driver. He
is an irregulatity of the ankle joint _due to knows no o~h_er occupations. His education
the fractures which is called an "overlapped wa_s halted' when: he was in the eighth
- ,foot." Such a condition is generally pro- grade. His wag{ ~s a tug op~rator was
gressive. A marked deossification" Ct.1-n -be $1.RO per-hour, bu.~, the wage scale-has since
been raised. His,:,~ages' for .the last four
. seen.
The' dinical treatment' of plaintiff was \vccks prior to the:accident totalled $407.46.
",[50 described. T'he cast was kept on the During the past 8 ot 9 months plaintiff bOas
le'ft leg until December, 1947. The- leg was heen working in ~ radio shop, taking care
bandaged nntil about February, 1948. Then of it when the me'chanic 'goes out on calls.
· a foot drop brace was applied which has a His earn'ings from t~is vary from $5 to $20
- ~ri'illg adion designed to' force the foot - a week, depending' apon the titne the store
upwards into a normal (right angle) po- is left in his care~ i, (
sition. Plaintiff was constantly in pain
There is evid'enc;e that the 1if~ e~pectancy
during this period. The brace did not is 36.12 years for" ';"'hite male'of plaintiff's
force the foot ·back into a normal pos~tion age.. The amount ,rc;quired to pay a person
and the foot is now permanently deformed of that age the suni c# $250 a month:~ntil he
as a, result of the injury. and deossification. is 65 years of age, cq~puting the interest at
Plaintiff cannot move his foot upwards at 2%, would ,be $64,048. If the interest rate
all. He lacks about 50 degrees of normal '\~~re 2¥2%,'lhe net~sary amount would be
movement of the left foot. If he walk, .at $60,055. The ,urn' df $56,430 would be re"
ql~ired if the interest~'rate'were 3%-. 'Th'ere
all it will be ~ith.a limp.
P~aintiff ,is- slo\vly recovering :from a is testimony that j~ insurance companies
paralysis of the peroneal nerve and there is would guarantee an interest- rate of between
" permanent weakness and wMtagc of the 2% and Z%%.
" i: .
· muscles 111 the left leg.
'Defendant gave--no-evidence on thc'subThe only operations possible are an am- ject of damag:e~. t~'his opening statement,
putation of the left foot or a fusilll( of the defendant', counsel ':stated that the existankle joint, making it'rigid. T'he pain will cnce of injuries was~ conceded and thc' only
grow worse,- but plaintiff should avoid question for the jury' was whether defendeither of these operations until l the pain bc- ant was liahle ther<i'ft)r.
comeS so -severe and is combined with so
The instruction~ to the jury contained
!I
much Hmitatioll of activity that an opera- the following:
t1:on becomes absolutely necessary. He will'- .
i: ~; .'
"You witl _distin,c~.•. ly understand that in
,have to wear the leg brace continuously ·this charge the C!>tU·t
t ,is in no manner or
ui1less an operation is performed.
form expressing, or idcsircs to express, any
. -rh.e disability is such _that plaintiff "will opinion on the .wdi~ht of the evidence, or
nO.t be able to return to any Quty. that re- 3ny _part thereof j Ifor doc~ the COt1r~ cxquires constant standing or wa1kinJ'{, or auy press any opinion a~' to the tn,lth or fahity
physi~al effort such as climbing or doing of the testimony ~f :kny ,witness; nor tioes
~Y."erbe~d., w.ork. He should. not engage ill, the Court in any m~uincr or form' c~press its
any activity that would require walking 011 opinion that any alleged fact in this case is
j

~
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* * *

(Q)uestions of

fact * • • are matters entirely within
your province. * • *
"If the judge of this Court has at any
time during this trial used any language,
or has seemed to you to indicate the opinion

The motion to amend the prayer of the
complaint was argued and granted in cham-

bers. And although the jury was never informed of the court's action on the motion,
the majority opinion intimates that the
jury could infer from the emphasized inof the judge as to any question of fact * * struction, naming the amount of plaintiff's
you must not be influenced thereby, but claim, as increased by the amendment, that
must determine yourselves all questions of the motion was granted, that the granting

fact without regard to the opinion of any- of the motion indicated the trial judge's belief that the evidence warranted a larger
one else. * * •
"You will be instructed on the subject of
the measure of dam-ages in this action, beM
cause it is my duty to instruct you as to all
the law that may become pertinent in your

recovery than that originally claimed, and

that it is possible that the jury disregarded

aU the other explicit instructions and returned a verdict based upon this double inference. The foregoing review of the evideliberations. IJ of course, do not know
dence and instructions demonstrates that
whetMr you will need 'nstructions on Ihe
measure of damages, and the fact that they this asserted possibility is devoid of reality, and is the result of fantastic specu]a-

have been given to you must not be considered as intimating any opinion of ~
own on the issUe of liability or as 10 which
Parly is entitled 10 your verdict. * * •
"You are instructed that the law pre-

tion by the majority, who utterly iguore the
determination of the trial court that defendant suffered no prejudice as a result
of the motion or instruction.

The majority opinion states that prejuscribes no definite measure of damages,
but the law leaves such damages to be fixed dice to defendant must have occurred from

by you as your discretion dictates and as,
under all the circumstances, may be just
and proper. * * *
tiThe damages must be reasonable and
cannot b~ in excess of tke amount alleged in
1M complaint, n"mely $75,000.00. • * *
"You are instructed. that if your verdict
is in favor of the plaintiff, then in fixing
damages you should award such amount as
will compensate for the injuries sustained,
if any, including such amount as will com..
pensate for the pain and suffering en-

dured. * * *
"If you believe from the evidence that the

the asserted misconduct because the doctrine of comparative negligence was involved in this action and for the further
reason that the jury returned its verdict
within 3S minutes after the case was submitted to it. No reason is stated, and I
am unable to find any reason, why the jury
should have taken more time to resolve

the simple ·factual issues presented. The
only real disputed question as to a probative fact was whether or not the clutch was
defective. Although considerable evidence
was received during the trial, most of it
was directed to that issue.

Neither is there any explanation as to
injuries sustained by the plaintiff are per.. how the presence of the comparative neglimanent in their character, then you will gence doctrine indicates prejudice to detake into account the period of time in the fendant. Even if it be assumed that the
future during which he will be expected to jury could infer from the instructions that
suffer such pain, humiliation, disfigure- the motion to amend the prayer was grantment, or disability, if any. * * * u ed and that this was done because the

(Emphasis added)
trial judge believed that the evidence of
The jury was also fully and fairly in- plaintiff's injuries would justify a larger
structed on the elements of damages and verdict, there is nothing whatsoever upon
th,e subjects of negligence, contributory which an inference could be based lhat 1M
negligence, comparative negligence and court believed Ihal plaintiff was entitled
proximate cause.
to recover al aU. As heretofore quoted,

SANGUINETTI v. MOORE DRY DOCK CO.
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the jury .was specifically charged that in,tructions on the subject of the measure of
damages were given so that_~e instructions
would completely state ,the 1aw applicable
to the issues in the case, and that "the fact
that they (instructions on damages) have
been given to -you must not be considered
as intimating an,y opinion of my own on
the issue of liability: ,or as to which party
is entitled to your,,verdiCt." Moreover, the
motion to amend was made at the close of
plaintiff's case and ~efore the introduction
of any evidence by the defendant, that is,
before the trial judge had any knowledge
as to- the merits of defendant's case contesting its liability.
The evidence also indicates that,the erucial and decisive-question in the c~se was
whether or not defendant negligently ,maintained defective equipment. The principal
defense'.was- lack of negligence-lack of
any responsibility for the serious injuries
admittedly suffered by ,plaintiff.. Plaintiff
introduced substantial, if not overwhelming, evidence- in support of his position on
this point. Even the witnesses for defendant conceded that the tug engine was obsolete and _in need of some repairs., It is
apparent that the jury was entitled, if not
compelled. to find in favor .of -plaintiff on
the matter of defendant's negligence.
There was little, if any, evidence tending
to show any contributory negligence on the
part of plaintiff. The nature of the case
is such that it is highly improbable t.hat'the
jury could have believed plaintiff's evideuce concerning defendant's negligence
whi,le at the same time rejecting plaintiffs
evidence as to ,his lack 'of contributory neg.ligence. There ,was no dispu~e as to the
nature and extent of plaintiff's injuries, the
extent and duration of his disability. the
degree to which his' earning power was im·
paired, or the amount of pain and stlffering caused .by the injuries. The verdict ,is
not excessive in 'view of this evidence.
. See McNulty v. Southern Pacific ·Co.• 96
Cal.App.2d 841, 846-851, 216 P.2d 534, and
Cases cited.
The majority opinion states: "This is
not * * * a case in which the error
can be said to be nonprejudicial because the
issues were resolved on undisputed or over-
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whelming evidence." It is obvious that
this statement
not based upon anything
in the record. As ,has heen pointed out,
the evidence on the matter of damages was
"undisputed," and this ,is the matter as to
which the alleged misconduct or error was
directed. .Also, the evidence in favor of
plaintiff
the subject of contributory negligence could accurately b~ described as
<40verwhelming." The testimony indicating
defendant's negligence also appears to be
clear and convincing.
The m~jority decision here is entirely
out of line with the California decisions
dealing with misconduct of counsel. Thus,
in the following cases the ruling of the trial
court in denying a new trial on the ground
of misconduct of,counsel was not disturbed
upon appeal, although the instances of aileged misconduct as set forth below are far
more serious than the actions of plaintiffs
attorney in this ease:
During the trial plaintiff's attorney read
the' contents of incompetent (hearsay) doc'uments in the presence of the jury. Robinson v. Western States Gas & Elec. Co.•
supra, 184 . Cal . 401 " 407 '194 P.39
; see,
also, Lafargue v. United Railroads, supra,
183 Cal. 720, 192 P. 538. Defendant's counsel, in a personal injury action, repeatedly
got before the jury the idea that their side
had an eyewitness to the accident who saw
the plaintiff run in front of the train, aIthough such a witness was never produced.
Rather v. City a.-nd County 0'£ San Francisco, 81 CaI.App.2d 625, 637, 184 P.2d 7Z1.
Counsel for the plaintiff habitua~ly mispronounced the _defendant's name -during the
trial and in'·the 'course" of argument reo
ferred to plaintiff as an American -boy; the
inference being that counsel was purposely
trying to prejudice the jury- against a man
with a foreign name. Porter v. Granich,
136 CaI.App. 523, 531, 29 P.2d 220; see,
also, Spear v.,Leuenberger, 44 Ca1.App.2d
236, 112 P.2d 43. In his opening statement
in an action for assault and battery, the
attorney for the plaintiffs referred to the
defendants as desperadoes, racketeers" cat.
tIe gangsters and drunken brutes. D,eevy
v. Tassi, 21 Cal.2d 109, 121-122, 130 P.2d
389; see. aiso, "McCabe v. Cheseldine, 117
Cal.App. 526, 4 P.2d 282. Defendants'
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counsel, in arguing to the jury, accused
plaintiff's attorney of refusing to settle the
case because of his wish to receive a iarge
fee. In his opening statement plaintiff's
attorney had stated that "we have sued for
$15,000." The verdict was in favor of
plaintiff for $600, although the injuries
were serious. Johnson v. McRee, 66 Cal.
App.2d 524, 529-530, 152 P.2d 526; ,ec,
also, Fintel v. Engelbrecht, 28 Cal.App.2d
23, 81 P.2d 1044. In an action against a
contractor for personal injuries sustained
by an employee of the Bureau of Reclamation during the construction of a dam,
there were repeated references by plaintiff's attorney to the fact that the contractor held a $35,000,000 contract to construct
the dam. Miller v. Pacific Constructors,
Inc., 68 Cal.App.2d 529, 551-;.'2, 157 P.2d
57; see, also, Alberts v. Lytle, 1 Cal.App.
2d 682, 691-692, 3i P.2d 705. Plaintiff's
counsel made statements which tended to
."Uggest to the jury that plaintiff was impoverished and without means, where
there was no evidence of such poverty.
Hodge v. Weinstock, Lubin & Co., 109 Cal.
App. 393, 401-403, 293 P. 80; see, also,
Oakes v. Baker, 85 Cal.App.2d 168, 192
P.2d 460. The attorney for plaintiff represented to the jury in his opening statement the existence of facts (that defendant
corporation's equipment was old and obsolete, undermanned, and without proper
safeguards) which plaintiff was prepared
to prove, but which plaintiff did not attempt
to prove and which he allegedly knew at
the time could not be proved. Mudrick v.
Market Street Ry. Co., 11 Cal.2d 724, 737738, 81 P.2d 950, 118 A.L.R. 533; see, also,
Adylott v. Key System Transit Co., 104
Cal.App. 621, 286 P. 456. In his closing
argument counsel for plaintiff, without any
basis in the evidence, painted defendant
company as accustomed to callously trying
to "beat" claims of its patrons by such
means as subjecting them to the expense
of lawsuits, influencing witnesses by suggestion and confusing evidence, and the use
of political influence. Jonte y. Key System,
89 CaI.App.2d 654, 201 P.2d 562; see, also,
Girard v. Irvine, 97 Cal.App. '377, 275 P.
840. In discussing the testimony of a po~
lice officer who had bten a witness for the

plaintiff, dcf~tlllant's attorney reicrred to
police scandals not connected with the case.
Woebbe v. Sperry, 48 Cal.App.2d 340, 344,
119 P.2d 743; sec, also, Walters v. Evick,
93 Cal.App. I, 15-16, 268 P. 1061. In an
action on promissory notes to which th(;
defense of frauu was interposed, counsd
for defendants repeatedly referred to the
verdict of the jury in another case finding
the procurer of the notes guilty of fraud.
although the judgment in that case had
been reversed. Liberty Bank v. Nonnenmann, 96 Cal.App. 478, 487-488, 274 P.
568; sec, also, Draper v. Hellman Commercial T. & S. Bank, 203 Cal. 26, 4(}..41, 263
P. 240; Weddle v. Loges, 52 Cal.App.2d
115, 123, 125 P.2d 914.
Comparing the majority decision with the
foHowing criminal cases dealing with the
misconduct of prosecuting attorneys as se:
forth below in which judgments of com"iction were affirmed, it seems that the life
and liberty of the defenuants in those case"
was not as highly valued as are the -fund~
of defendant corporation here:
In the course of his case the prostcl1!iog attorney called out the name of defendant's wife as a witness, ahhough h('
was aware that she had not been subpoenaed and he had no intention of doing
so. Also, in his argument to the jury, the
prosecuting attorney made repeated references to the defendant's failure to call
his wife as a witness, stating that she was
present when the events in question took
place. People v. Klor, 32 Cal.Zd 658, 662664, 197 P.2d 705. Defendant, a Negro,
was tried before an all Negro jury. In his
opening statement the district attorney
referred to race prejudice and stated, jn
effeet, that the jury should convict the
defendant if they wanted to avoid public
criticism for favoring a defendant of their
own race. People v. Fisher, 86 Ca1.App.
2d 24, 32-33, 194 P.2d 116; see, also,
People v. Macias, i7 Cal.App.2d 71, 88-89,
174 P.2d 895. The district attorney, in
arguing to the jury that the death sentence
should. be imposed in a murder case, said
that if the defendant ,were sentenced to
life imprisonment he -would probably be
paroled in ten or twelve years and i!ltj·
mated that the penal institutions Were
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v!!ry crowded $0 that paroles were granted
without regard to. mcrit'i~ order to proyide
space for in~oming prisoners. People y.
Cae~anoJ 29 -Cal.2d 616, 619-620, 17i P.2d
1. The. closing argument of ,the- district
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'Which he claims was ~xcessive. The first
of these was a'n instrttdion of the court
to the effect that the' jury might, after
considering all the clements contributi~g
to plaintiff's _<iaril1lgc, 'resalve \vhat sum

attorney contained _references to the_ de- wi11 fairly compensate' her for "the injury
fendants. as, ';gat}1hl(>rs." ;;ex-collyicts," and loss, if any, sustained by her; not
"gangsters," .nid statl'nler.ts to the effect ('xc('('ding~ hm.C'c'lJer. the omoullt prayed

tbat the county'·!'h.,ufd be p~ot~derl from
People Y. :Brancato. 83 Cal.
App.2d 734, 74G-742, 189 P.2d}04.
It is evident from defendant's briefs
that its 'real -complaint is directed to the
giving of. the -instruction:: _naming the
amount of: the _prayer. From the citation
of 'Cases in the majority opinion dealing
with misconduct of the trial judge, Ber.
guin-v. Pacific E1ec. -Ry. Co., 203 Cal. 116,
263 p, 220; People, v, Mahoney, 201. -Cal.
618,258 P. 607; People v.. Robinson; 73 Cal.
App.2d 233. 166 P.2d 17; Steele v. Wardwell, 57 Cal.1\pp.2d 642, 135 P.2d 628; P,'opie v. Frank; 71 Ca1.A·pp: 57S: 236 P. 189,
and' the gil-ing of .erroneolls Instr~ctiolls~
Clement Y., State Reclamation Board, 35
Ca1.2d 628,,220, P.Z<.l 897; -'Intagliata v.
Shipowners & Merchants Towboat 'C~.,
26 Ca1.2d· 365, 159 P.2d I; Oettinger v.
Stewart, 24 C~1.2d 133, 148 P.2d 19, 156
A.L.R.1221; People v. Dail, 22 Cal.2d 642,
140 P.2d 828; Pipoly v. BensOll, 20·Ca1.2d
366, 125 P.2d 482, 147 A.L.R: 515; People
y: 'WiHianis;' 17 :Cal. '142;' .Bollenbach v.
United States, 326 o,S.607, 66 S.Ct. 402.
90 L.Ed. 350; Starr v. United States, 153
U~~,"614, 14,S.Ct. 919, 38,L.Ed. 841, it is
apparent. that the -majority c'onsider this
inst~uction, to be ~ri1proper a ll d a ground
for reyersal of the 'judgment, espedal1y in
view of the fae,t that the jury would not
have Iearned of, the grantinK'of the _motion
but' for this instruction.
I '
. The la~, of Califor~ia h~s long ];,een
~ettled to _the contrary. The propriety of
~uch an instruction' was upheld in Lahti
v. McMcnarilin" -204 Cal, 415, 421, 268 P.
~" 646, and the following comments are
pertinent here:
,'~Defendant suggests. a ·number of cir~
cumstances happening .during the trial
.which, ,he contends, had the effect of im.properly influencing- the jury to render
the verdict in the amount specified, and
~uch, people.

fo'r in -'ftc cOlllPll1b~t., to- 'wif? $16~312.10.'
That portion at the instruction italicized
is .the ponion to which defendant'. particularly objects. An instruction' of this
character is usuany given' in negligence
cases, and it is_ difficult to l1nde'r-st3nd- how
a jury ~n 'sucl~ class of cases -c~n 'be properly mstructc<.l by th<.· coilrt without emplaying language similar to that used by
the court in t~e instructio1). complained of.
The,re could be no er~or, therefore, in _so
instructing the jury. If the defe.dollt
desired .the jury further, instructed to the
effect that the amount nalned therein did
IIot necessarily furnish any criterion for
.the a~oun't oj' titcir _",'crdic/J it 'Zoos his dutJ'
to ask for such quali/)'ing ,instt"1lction? pnf/.
flot having'd()lIe SO, he cannot be_ heard to
complain that·it. 'was not .qivcn/' (Emph"asis added.) See, also, Blantonv. CUrl},
20 Cal.2d 793, 129 P.2d I; MeNultyv.
Southern Pacific Co., supra, 96 Ca1.App.2d
841, 852-853, 216. P.2d. 534, and cases.ciied:
Powers v.. Shelton, 74 Ca1.App.2d 757,' 765766, 169.r·2d 482; .. ,c_ases collected' in ,2
A.L.R.2d 459,,461. .
.
Here, assuming that the .instruction
naming the amount of, plaintiff's claim
as amended, waS" 'Capable_ of being misinterpreted in--view of the other instrrlc·
tions 'on the'matter of -liability and darnages, ,the defendant, not having requested
a: 'Clarification- of the instruction, is in no
position- to complain of the' lack thereof
at,this titne~ An instruction to the 'effect
that the amount of the prayer was_ merely
~ c1aim"and not evidence, would have been
r'r~per and" presuma.bly, woul(ll~aye 'hee.n
giye!\.if. requested. See CaHfornia Jury
Instructions, Civil, Instructions 173 et
~eg.; Eastlick v. City of Los Angeles.
Ca1.2d 661, 67~74, 177 P.2d 558, 170
A.L.R. 225.
.
!
The precise contention raised here was
expressly rejected in Buswell v. City and
<
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County of San Francisco, 89 Cal.App.2d
123, 134, 200 P.2d 115, 121, where it was
said:
uThe second point brings up the question
of whether the court should mention to the
jury the amount sued for. It is contended
that by so doing the judge in effect is
.telling the jury that in the particular case
he believes that the evidence warrants a
finding that any SUm 'within the amOfmt
sued for would be reasonable to (l.'umrd as
damages. Many judges do not mention
the sum sued for. Others do. In Hallinger v. York Rys. Ca., Z25 Pa. 419, 74
A. 344, 17 Ann.Cas. 571, the practice af
mentioning the amount is condemned. On
the other hand, B.A.J.I., page 198 states:
fIt is thought by some that the amount of
damages aHeged in the complaint should

not be stated to the jury in the instructions.
The editorial committee feel that this is
largely a, matter of discretion with each
judge in each case, However, it is the
opinion of a majority of the committee
that there is no sound reason why the
judge should not state the amount claimed.
Counsel may do so, and usually do. We
believe that the intended effect of the
instruction is made more certain by a
frank statement of the amount claimed.
A noticeable avoidance of that fact might
arouse curiosity. It may well be doubted
that a defendant ever is injured by an
instruction as here suggested. On the
other hand, we feel certain that there
have been cases when a defendant was
helped by a jury's impression that the
plaintiff filed an exorbitant claim. Such
a result, however, is plaintiffs own harvest.' Assuming that the HoIIinger case
states the better practice, we cannot say
that in California the mentioning of the
amount sued for is error." (Emphasis
added.)
Similarly, in Norfalk & Western Ry.
Co. v. Earnest, 229 U.S. 114, 33 S.Ct.
654, 57 L.Ed. 10%, an action under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45
U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq., invalving the dactrine of comparative negligence, an instruction was given to the effect that, if
the verdict was far the plaintiff, he shauld
be awarded "such an ,amount of damages,

not exceeding $20,000" as would compensate him for the injury. The prayer
was for the sum stated. Rejecting the
argument that this instruction "erroneously conveyed to the jury an intimation
that a finding that the plaintiff's damages
amounted to $20,000 was justified by the
evidence," the court stated at p. 120 of
229 U.S., at page 656 of 33 S.Ct.: "Laoking at the entire paragraph _we think it
could not have been understood by the
jury as conveying such an intimation, and
that the words now criticized could only
have been understood as marking a limit
beyond which ,the jury could not go."
See, also, Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v.
Carnahan, 241 U.S. 241, 244-245, 36 S.Ct.
594, 60 L.Ed. 979; Dowell, Inc., v. Jowers,
5 Cir., 182 F.2d 576, 580; Ritzman v.
Mills, 102 Cal.App. 464, 468 et seq., 283
P.88.
The instruction questioned by, the defendant in Eastlick v. City of Los Angeles,
supra, 29 Cal.2d 661, 177 P.2d 558, 566, 170
A.L.R. 225, was as follows: "The amount
of damages alleged in the complaint to have
been suffered by plaintiff is $8,895.00. This
allegation is merely a claim and is not evidence and must not be considered by you
as evidence. It does, however, fix a maximum limit and you are not permitted to
award ,plaintiff more than that amount."
The complaint was amended at the trial to
conform to the proof. As amended, it alleged items of damage for injuries caused
by the defendant's negligence totalling
$7,385 (general damages of $5,000 and special damages ot $2,385), but. the prayer
was changed ta $8,895. The defendant
maintained that the amount stated in the instruction should have been the total sum
of the items of alleged damages "rather
than the inftat'ed figure of the prayer,"- In
reply to this contention, it was said 29 Cat.
2d at page 674, 177 P.2d at page 566: "Regardless of the merit of defendant's' objection, which properly should have been
made in the trial court so that the discrepancy could have been there obviated
(Lahti v. McMenamin, 3)4 Cal. 415, 421,
268 P. 644), no harm appears to flave resulted from the inaccuracy in the' instruction. The verdict was for $5,000, well with-
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in the figure conceded by defendant to represent the limit of plaintiff's total demand."
See, also, Sonstelie v; l)ush, 102 CaI.App.
396, 399-400, 28.3 P .. 336. It is noteworthy
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sion to be derived from the majority opinion i. that Lahti and similar case. are to be
overruled sub silenlio: ApiparentIy, the
Pennsylvania rule is to. be adopted to the

that the defendant's counsel in that ,case did effect that it is reversihle error for plain-

not consider it worthwhile to argue that it tiff's counsel, Carothers v. Pittsburg Rys.
was improper to instruct the jury accurate- Co., 229 Pa. 558, 79 A., 134; Quinn v.

Iy as to the amount of plaintiff's ~Iaims, as
amended.
Blant01l v. Curry, supra, 20 Ca!2d 793,
806, 129 P.2d I, 8, was an action to recover

Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 224 Pa.

162,73 A. 319; Vaughan v. Magee, 3 Cir.,
218 F. 630; see Porter v. Zeuger Milk Co.,
136 Pa.Super. 48, 7 A.2d 77, or the trial
damages for personal injuries sustained by -court, Hollinger v. York Rys. Co., 225 Pa.
the plaintiffs when struck by an automobile 419, 74 A. 344; Reese v. Hershey, 163 Pa.
driven by defendant Curry. It
held not 253, 29 A. 907, to state to the jury· the

was

to be prejudicial error for. the trial court amount of damages claimed in anegligence
to instruct .the jury, "by way of explana- action, despite the esta.l>lished taw and praction and example,"., that. the judgment in tice in this state to the contrary. Thus.
the case might be for $10,000 against Curry, the majority· opinion cites with apparent
Magee,
the driver, but could be for only $5,000 approval the case of Vaughan
against Koehler, the -owner of the car, un- supra, which states' and follows the Penn~

v.

less it was found -that Koehler',_ was the sylvania .rule.
principal and Curry was the ag~nt;'in which
The New York cases cited by defendant

case .there was rio such limitation as to
Koehler. The jury returned a verdict of
$10,000 against each of the defendants.
. (It does not appear whether the jury accomplished its task within a 35 minute
period.) Certainly such an instruction is

4eal with the propriety of allowing amendments to the complaint during the trial and
therefore they are not. in point. The basis
of the decision in Kenney v. South Shore
Natural Gas & Fuel CD., 126 App.Div. 236,
110 N.Y.S. 503, 504, is illustrated by the
'more preinant 'with _possibilities of preju· following comments in the opinion: "It
'dice- than is the ..;m~ 'given in the present ,seems that the. court on -the trial of an ac-

case.
I am unable to see any distinction of sub,stance.betwee,n th~ Lahti case and the situa, tion presented here., .It is a common prac-

.tiOn may, in the proper exercise of its
discretion, permit' plaintiff to amend his
complaint ,by increasing the' amount of
damages demanded. (Citations.) Although

tice for the attorney for the plaintiff to the exercise of this power of the trial court
state to the jury the amount of, his claim has received frequent recognition and apand I am not _aware that that practice has proval, we do not think such an amendment

ever been questioned. See Johnson v. McRee, supra, q6. CaI.App.2d 524, 530, 152 P.
~ 2d 526;. Ritiman v, Mills, supra, 102 Cal.
App.464, 472, 283 P. 88; California Jury
Instructions,· Civil, p. .198.. Under the

,can properly be permitted simply upon
plaintiff's motion, unsupported by any suggestion explaining why application for Ihe
privilege had ..01 previously been made at
Special Term, or excusing Iheapparent

Lahti case ~t is also, proper for the court
:to instruct the jury as to the amount of the
prayer. If the plaintiff states his. claim in
his opening statement the Jury,
learn
,from the ipstructions whether or not' an

laches in not earlier presenting such appU.
cation. Even if application had been made

will

amendment to the prayer has been allowed
during the trial, regardless of whether the
-motion to_ aDlend is made in the presence or
absence .of the. jury.. A distinction based
upon the latter factor .is a distinction with·

-out a <tifference. The only possible conclu-

at Special Term for the desired amend~ent, some reason showing the propriety
of the amendment at that time would have
.been required or the motion would have
been I'roperly denied. * • •
"We do not now assume to pass upon the
. question whether the plaintiff on proper
application may not, be entitled to such an
amendment; bul hald simply that, as the

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _"',!'il!*i,1 _ _
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case is-now prc.fctt./i.~.d to US~ ihe motion 'It'aS the amount of unliquidated damages
improperly granted and the verdict there- claimed by the plaintiff. See; apparently
fore unwarranted." (Emphasis added.)
The dissenting opinion advanced the view
that the allowance of the amendment in~
creasing the damage claim was \\;thin the
discretion of the trial court.
It is apparent that the decision in that
case was not based upon misconduct of
counselor the giving of erroneOUS instructions, but upon the ground that an amendment to the complaint should not Ibe allowt!d
during the trial unless the plaintiff states
stlfficient reasons why the amcndmcllt 'was
not requested at an earlier time when the

facts were known to him. That it is within
the discretion of the trial court to grant
a motion to amend the complaint at the
close of the plaintiff's case, as 'was done
here, cannot be seriously questiolled in this
state. As has been shown, the California
practice is to liberalJ)~ allow such :lmendments and the trial court's exercise of its
discretion in this matter will rarely be disturbed upon appeal.
Sandresky v. Erie R. Co., 91 Misc. 67,
153 N.Y.S. 612, also involves the propriety
of granting leave to 'amend since it appears
th~t the plaintiff therein was permitted to
amend his complaint by increasing the damage claim at the opening of the trial. The
trial court's action at that time could not
possibly support all inference that the judge
believed a higher verdict was warranted.
Pfeil v. Klein, 247 App.Div. 510, 286 )[.
Y.S. 721, cites and follows the Kellney ami
Sandre sky cases and the language used in
the opinion indicates that it is based upon
the same point.
In Sawyer v. Munson S. S. Line, D. c.,
7 F.Supp. 193, the Kenney ease is cited for
the following proposition: li:\Iotion to increase the amount of damages should 110t
bc made at the trial of the action, but
should be made in advance of the tria1."
It is trUe that there are statements in the
Kenney and Pfeil cases to the effect' that
an application for leave to il1cr'!ase the
amonnt of the prayer should not be made
in the presence of the jury. However,
there seems to be some doubt in New York
as' to whether the jury should ever be informed or instructed in any manner as to

applying the Pennsylvania. rule, Gilbertson
v. Forty-Second St. etc. Ry. Co., 14 App.
Div. 294, 43 N.Y.S. 782, 784; Rost v.
Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 10 App.Div. 477,
41 ".\".S. 1069, 1072-1073; Wersebc v.
Ilroauway & S. A. R. Co., Misc. 4n, 21
N.Y.S. fi3i.
Decisions merely stating that the motion
to amCl1ft. \\'as not made in the presence of
the jury, as in Buswell v. City and County
of San Francisco, supra, 89 Cal.App.2d 123,
133, 200 P.2d 115; Sohman v. Metropolitan
SI. Ry. CG., 56 Misc. 342, 106 N.Y.S. 1033;
Walker v. Bradt, 225 App.Div. 415, 233 N.
Y.S. 388; Prichard v. Dubinsky, 338 Mo.
360, 89 S.W.2d 530; Hinchliffe v. \Venig
Teaming Co., 274 Ill. 417, 113 N.E. 707,
obviously do not provide any support for
the majority decision here.
The wild charges directly or inferentially
made by defendant of "recklessness in advocacy," "deliberate and gross misconduct"
which was "deHberately designed to mislead and prejudice the jury," "yieious practice," and f;fraud and deceit" on the part of
plaintiff's attorney are entirely without
foundation in the record,' Neither does the
reproduction of false, misleading and Sensationalized newspaper articles in its petition for hearing add anything at all to the
legal sufficiency of defendant's argument.
Such tactics suggest that defendant's
cOlltlsel 'believes this court to be incapable
of determining the importance of the points
made without the "assistance" of news ..
paper reporters.
V\'~ c have here .nothing more than a routine motion and a customary instruction. I
see no misconduct in the making of the
motion and no error in the instruction. I
cannot understand ho\v the combination of
the two factors results in reversible error
under any circumstances, unless, as heretofore suggested, the majority believe that
the Pcnnsylvania rule should be adopted in
this state, making the amount of damages
claimed a sacred subject, not to be touched
upon by counselor the court. Equally
fanciful, yet finding support" in the opinion
of the majority here, would be the argu·
ment that the granting of a motion to
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Alvin. Gerlack, San Frandsco, Landr~m

conform to the proof during the trial, as & Silveira,. Merced, for appellant.
where a new or. different cause of action _ C. Ray Robinson, by ·'V. Eugene CraveD
or issue is injected into the case, consti- and James A. Cobey and Margaret A. Flynn,
tutes reversible error on the ground that all of Merced, for respondent.
this sugg ~sts to the jury that the trial judge
believes the evidence warrants the' plaintiff's recovery under the amendment.

PEEK, Justice.
This is an appeal by defendant from a

In my opinion there was. no erTor or mis- judgment declaring, a. forfeiture of, a lease
and ordering restitution of the premises to
the respondent plaintiffs, ,and from the or-

conduct in the trial court and the judgment should' be affirmed.
Rehearing denied; GIBSON, C. J., and
CARTER and TRAYNOR, JJ., dissenting.

der denying defendant's motion for judg,
ment notwithstanding the verdict.

The settled statement upon which the
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March 19, 1951.

cause is presented states that the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the materiaL
allegations of plaintiffs' complaint is not
questioned. Defendant's sole contention is
that plaintiffs are precluded from maintaining their action for unlawful "detainer un-

der section 1161, subd. 3 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, since 'the lel}-se' did not expressly provide for re-entry or forfeiture for his
alleged breach of the covenants and conditions thereof relative to the manner in which'
he farmed the premises.
The pertinent portions of the' section

'Guy A. McCarty and aitotMr sued A. Ra· above mentioned provide that a: tenant of
80 for unlawful detainer alleging '8 'breach of real property is guilty of unlawful detainer

covenant and conditl,ons of a: lease relative when he continues in possession after "a neto the, manner -In which defendant farmed
glect or failure to perform other conditions
premises leased to him by plaintiffs. The Su,or
covenants 0,£ 'the lease or agreement unperior Court, Merced. County, D. Oliver Germino, J., rendered a judgment "declaring a der which the property is 'held", and he has

forfeiture of the lease and ordering restitu- failed 10 perform following service upon
tion of the premises to the plaintltfs, and him of the three day notice as therein

the defendant appealed.. The District Court vided.

pr~

.

Of Appeal, Peek, J., held' that the action for

While th~ remedy here in question exists
!IOlely
by virtue of the ,statute, and the statthe tact that the lease did not expressly
provide for re-entry or forfeiture for breach ute, is -to be construed, Woods-Drury, Inc.,
of the covenants and conditions concerned. v, S\1perior Court, 18 CatApp.2d 340, 63 P.
2d 1184, still it bas long been the established
Affirmed.
unlawful detainer would lie, notwithstanding

, rule in this state that an action for unlawful detainer will lie for the breach of "any
Lessors we:re not precluded from main- covenant or condition of the lease" j' Silva

Landlord and le,;anl ¢=200(2)

taining their action for unlawful detainer
under statute even though lease did not expressly provide .for re-entry. or forfeiture
for alleged breach of covenants and con-

v_ Campbell, 84 Cal. 420, 24 P. 316, 317, upon
the giving of the notice provided for in said
statute. See also Kelly v. Teague, 63 Cal.
. 68; Knight v. Black, 19 Cal.App. 518, 126

clitions ,relating to manner in which lessee P. 512.

farmed premises. Code Civ.Proc. § 1161,
subd. 3.

The cases cited by appellant in support of
his contention are not in point since each

